Parole and Power: Constitutional Restrictions on Immigration Revocation

Spring 2025

Lauren Ellis

Edited By: Katy Fyvie

Humanitarian parole, a venerable but rarely utilized provision of the U.S. immigration code, has recently been at the heart of national uproar. This provision allows the executive branch to authorize temporary admission to the United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” under Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) [1]. Historically, humanitarian parole was used sparingly—typically in situations involving urgent medical treatment or in rare, case-by-case circumstances for asylum seekers. However, under the Biden administration, this provision was adapted for broader, programmatic use, reshaping its traditional function.

This expanded use of humanitarian parole quickly drew the attention of the Trump administration upon taking office in 2025. In March, the Department of Homeland Security announced it would rescind the parole status of migrants who had entered through Biden-era programs. Housed in this policy shift, hundreds of thousands of vulnerable individuals became susceptible to expedited deportation, with enforcement scheduled to begin on April 24, 2025. The announcement spurred immediate lawsuits and public outcry, raising fundamental constitutional questions about executive authority and the rights of migrants, specifically those who had followed federal guidelines to enter the country legally.

At the core of this legal dispute lies the question of how parole authority under the INA should be interpreted and applied. The Trump administration argues that the Secretary of Homeland Security has absolute discretion to revoke parole at any time, based on the assertion that parolees are not formally “admitted” into the United States. From their perspective, parole is a temporary, revocable privilege, and recipients should not expect enduring legal protection. This interpretation presents parole as a tool of administrative convenience: discretionary, impermanent, and subject to rapid reversal.

On the other side, plaintiffs represented by immigrant rights organizations such as the Justice Action Center contend that the government’s abrupt policy change is not just morally questionable—it is legally indefensible [2]. They argue that revoking status from migrants who lawfully entered under existing federal programs violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Their case hinges not just on statutory interpretation, but on constitutional principle.

During oral arguments, Federal District Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S. District Court in Boston expressed deep concern over the legality of the administration’s actions. “What you’re prioritizing is not people coming over the border,” she stated, “but the people who followed the rules” [3]. Her remarks reflect a broader unease with an executive approach that penalizes compliance and erodes the distinction between legal and unauthorized entry. If the executive branch can retroactively undo lawful status without individualized hearings or established criteria, then the promise of lawful immigration becomes uncertain at best, and meaningless at worst.

This is not merely a matter of administrative discretion; it is a crisis of constitutional governance. While humanitarian parole does not confer permanent residency or formal admission, it does create lawful presence under federal law. This distinction was clarified in Leng May Ma v. Barber (1958), a landmark Supreme Court case that held that parolees, though not officially admitted, are nonetheless “present under color of law” and entitled to procedural protections [5]. The Court warned that parole cannot be used as a workaround to deny individuals their constitutional rights.

Further strengthening this legal framework is Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that even noncitizens without permanent status are entitled to fundamental constitutional protections, particularly when facing the threat of indefinite detention [6]. In this case, the Court ruled that the government could not detain immigrants indefinitely, emphasizing that constitutional rights do not vanish simply because a person lacks formal admission. Together, these precedents underscore that, when parole is granted and an individual is lawfully present in the U.S., people cannot be stripped of such protections without full adherence to due process.

Thus, the Trump administration’s plan for mass revocation is not simply a policy change but a constitutional overreach. The proposed revocation is not being applied through individual determinations or judicial review, but rather through a blanket administrative decree that affects hundreds of thousands of people. Such an approach disregards foundational principles of fairness, undermines procedural justice, and sets a perilous precedent: one in which rights granted today can be revoked tomorrow by political fiat.

This instability is a direct result of immigration protections that depend almost entirely on executive judgment. Because humanitarian parole operates within the flexible and often ambiguous boundaries of the INA—and is not firmly rooted in congressional statute—its implementation and repeal can swing dramatically with each new administration. This leaves migrants in legal limbo: technically within the bounds of the law, yet unprotected from the shifting winds of political leadership.

To resolve this systemic fragility, legislative action is urgently needed. Congress must codify the rules and safeguards governing humanitarian parole. This includes establishing uniform procedures for terminating status, defining eligibility criteria clearly, and guaranteeing access to judicial review. Critics of such codification argue that restricting executive flexibility may impair the government’s ability to respond swiftly in humanitarian crises. But constitutional consistency and human dignity should not be sacrificed in the name of bureaucratic convenience. Flexibility should exist within a structured legal framework, not outside of it.

Codification would provide critical stability for parole recipients and reinforce the notion that immigration policy must be rooted in the rule of law rather than executive whims. It would ensure that migrants who comply with government guidelines are not retroactively punished for doing so. Furthermore, it would create clear boundaries for future administrations, preventing sweeping changes that lack democratic accountability or legal clarity.

Finally, the Trump administration’s push to cancel parole on a mass scale shines a harsh light on the underlying vulnerability of emergency immigration mechanisms that rely solely on presidential discretion. While the INA does grant broad authority to the executive, that power is not unlimited. The constitutional limits on government action do not evaporate in the realm of immigration policy. The legal battles now underway over Biden-era parole efforts demonstrate that protections for migrants remain unstable precisely because they have not been anchored by legislative action.

Defending the due process rights of parolees is not only a legal obligation—it is a moral imperative. If the United States genuinely aspires to uphold its constitutional values, it must ensure that lawful presence, once granted, cannot be revoked arbitrarily.

The stakes are high. The federal court ruling expected later this year in the case heard by Judge Indira Talwani may determine the legal limits of parole revocation and whether mass enforcement will proceed. The outcome will have implications for hundreds of thousands of migrants and for future executive immigration policy. At the same time, Congress is beginning to act. The Parole Integrity and Accountability Act, introduced in early May 2025, seeks to formalize humanitarian parole procedures, set termination standards, and ensure judicial oversight [7]. Whether it gains bipartisan traction remains uncertain, but its introduction is a sign that lawmakers are starting to recognize the urgent need for reform.

Ultimately, this issue transcends partisan politics. It is about the kind of country the United States aspires to be—one where laws offer certainty, where rights are respected, and where individuals are not punished for trusting the government’s word. America now stands at a constitutional crossroads. Will it allow immigration protections to remain subject to the ever-shifting priorities of the presidency, or will it embed them in law and justice? The coming months will shape the future of humanitarian parole and define the boundaries of executive power. For migrants, legal advocates, and policymakers alike, the message must be clear: flexibility and compassion in immigration policy must never come at the expense of constitutional accountability. The nation’s legal foundations demand no less.

References

[1] “8 U.S. Code § 1182 - Inadmissible Aliens.” LII / Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1182 

[2] “Justice Action Center.” Justice Action Center. September 30, 2022. https://justiceactioncenter.org 

[3] Raymond, Nate. 2025. “US Judge to Block Trump from Revoking Thousands of Migrants’ Legal Status.” Reuters, April 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-judge-blocks-trump-revoking-thousands-migrants-legal-status-2025-04-10/ 

[4] Press, The Associated. 2025. “Trump Asks Supreme Court to End Humanitarian Parole to Potentially Deport 500,000 Migrants.” Oregonlive, May 13, 2025. https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2025/05/trump-asks-supreme-court-to-end-humanitarian-parole-to-potentially-deport-500000-migrants.html 

[5] Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/357/185 

[6] Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/533/678

[7] R-IA, Chuck. 2025. “Text - S.1589 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Immigration Parole Reform Act of 2025.” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1589/text